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Reviewed by 
Yvonne Giordano,
GREDEG, Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis
ygiordan@unice.fr
Intuition is already a long-standing concern (Agor, 1984; Barnard, 
1938; Simon, 1987) but it is often used as an “umbrella term” (Glöckner 
& Ebert, Chapter 14: 161), just as decision-making was in the past. For 
many years, under the inluence of the tradition of heuristics and biases 
(HB) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, in particular), intuitive processes 
and outcomes have been considered as ineicient mental shortcuts. 
Then, a relative turn-around for research into intuition currently gives 
rise to many publications which show a great vivacity in many disci-
plines. Martha Sinclair’s book (she was Senior Lecturer at the Univer-
sity of Brisbane when it was published) is one efective illustration and 
comes just at the right moment to draw up a statement in a spirit of 
“respectful disagree[ment]” (xvi). Research on intuition - and the very 
deinition of the concept - is highly controversial and the entire book il-
lustrates the discordant views to which it gives rise. The work has been 
written with a clear intention: to lead intuition out of a retrenched area, 
dealing with sub-scientiic processes and outcomes, and to give us 
fresh knowledge, speciically within and between cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience research. It discusses not only widely recognized 
works, but also other, less advanced contributions that prompt further 
research on the subject. We are left with no certainties once we are 
done reading, but rather a very stimulating invitation to continue explor-
ing, and in particular in the domain of management, which was one of 
the very irst ields to be concerned with intuition. 
STRUCTURE AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The book is made up of ive parts and twenty-one chapters. The irst 
part (Conceptualizing Intuition, Chapters 1 to 5) investigates the many 
diferent facets of the intuitive processes, and discusses conscious-
ness and afects. The second part (Functions of Intuition, Chapters 6 to 
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9) shows the links between intuition, on the one hand, and expertise, 
strategy, entrepreneurship and ethics, on the other. The third part (Intu-
ition in Professional/Occupational Domains, Chapters 10 to 15) shows 
‘intuition-in-action’ in various professional ields, including emergency 
medicine, law, movie sets and teaching. The fourth part (Nonlocal Per-
spective, Chapters 16 and 17) stretches the concept of intuition to its 
very limits by analyzing “noetic form and nonlocal intuition”, far from 
assuming that intuitions are the result of processed information that we 
already possess or have been in contact with. Finally, the ifth part (Cul-
tivating Intuition, Chapters 18 to 21) militates in favor of the idea that 
intuition is an available mental resource (mindfulness) and examines its 
qualities in relation to various activities, with a speciic focus on higher 
education. 
All of the thirty-six authors who contribute to this debate come from 
many and varied disciplines, which confers on the book a contrasted 
and pluralistic approach; this is to be welcomed in a work tackling such 
a controversial subject, which embraces such ields as cognitive and 
clinical psychology, neurobiology, medicine, management and organi-
zational behavior, education, economics and physics. All the authors 
work in varied ields and use diferent methods, which supports the no-
tion that intuition is of a cross-cutting nature: intuition is thus something 
which comes out as clearly in emergency medicine as it does in mana-
gerial decision-making or even the legal domain. As for the theme of 
decision-making, then, intuition does not speciically belong to a partic-
ular ield, and some of the authors who contribute to the book are from 
clearly multidisciplinary institutions. Moreover, Martha Sinclair calls for 
the development of collaborations across multiple disciplines as well 
as the increase of empirically grounded research, both using experi-
mental methods and in natural settings. Finally, the book exposes and 
discusses the most recent theories on the ways in which high-order 
animals learn, think and judge. 
MAIN ADVANCES
With intuition, we know simply that we know something without know-
ing how or why we know it (Sinclair, Chapter 1: 4). Broadly speaking, 
intuition may be deined as “direct knowing” that arises through rapid, 
non-conscious and holistic information processing or holistic associa-
tions (Dane & Pratt, 2007: 33). After a long period of doubt and criti-
cism surrounding this strange construct, intuition is now considered 
a legitimate subject of social scientiic inquiry (Hodgkinson & Sadler-
Smith, Chapter 5: 52). Evidently, researchers of the HB tradition have 
previously neglected intuition because of systematic errors and inferior 
choices made by experimental subjects. At the opposite of the HB tra-
dition, Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) (Klein, Chapter 6; Lipshitz, 
Klein & Orasanu, 2001; Salas, Rosen & DiazGranados, 2010) has em-
phasized the power of intuitive experts’ judgments in speciic real set-
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tings. This book tries to extend intuition beyond the limited area of deci-
sion-making; it does so because this concept is now cross-pollinating 
our knowledge and the ways we learn and think in our everyday lives. 
System 1 and System 2: dual processing models
One of the most important contributions to intuition is the development 
of System1/System 2 theories. According to these theories, the asso-
ciative learning system operates outside of awareness (System 1). By 
contrast, analysis is associated with the rational/deliberative system as 
intentional, primarily conscious, verbal and relatively afect-free (Sys-
tem 2). Humans process information in parallel systems, but there is 
no clear agreement about afects, their role and the time at which they 
are activated nor if the two systems are independent and travel through 
diferent pathways in the brain. The best-known theory is the Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) (Epstein, 2010 and Chapter 4), which 
claims that the two systems interact, working simultaneously and in-
luencing each other as they do so. The intuitive system usually reacts 
irst but another possible sequence is that the intuitive system reacts to 
the rational one, e.g. when a thought produced by the rational system 
instigates emotions or produces associations in the experiential one 
(Guzak & Hargrove, Chapter 9: 99). It seems that the mutual inluence 
of the experiential and rational systems results in conlicts and com-
promises between them. Methodologically, each type of processing 
should be captured by an independent scale. 
Nevertheless, CEST is not the only dual processing model. “Many of 
the current dual process models are default-interventionist models 
(authors’ emphasis) assuming that both systems interact with intuitive 
processes being activated by default and deliberative processes be-
ing activated only if necessary to intervene and correct” (Glöckner & 
Ebert, Chapter 14: 161; Evans, 2008). Other models suggest that both 
systems interact in parallel. For the reader who remains uncomfortable 
with this recent psychological research, the book does not appear to 
be terribly instructive: it is necessary to muddle through the chapters 
to gain a better understanding of the divergences between the models. 
Plessner, Betsch and Betsch (2008) introduce these models in a more 
advanced way, but their book is also rather more inaccessible for the 
non-specialist reader. The special issue of the Psychological Inquiry 
review (21, 2010), probably written at the same time as this book, pro-
vides useful assistance in grasping some subtle arguments which fall 
beyond the scope of this review. 
Meanwhile, other researchers such as Hammond (1996) maintain a 
“unidimensional view” (or “cognitive continuum view”): humans use one 
cognitive style at the expense of the other, with information ‘travelling’ 
along the same neural pathways. Rational/deliberative and intuitive 
styles are at the opposite ends of a single continuum. Each style is 
dependent on the degree of structuring of the task, its complexity, and 
its ambiguity (Guzak & Hargrove, Chapter 9: 100); one style may be 
preferred over the other. One “person cannot employ a high degree of 
intuition and deliberation at the same time” (Sinclair, 2010: 379). Ac-
cording to Sinclair, the apparent diferences between these theories 
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may not be so vast: while dual-systems theories examine the process 
(intuit-ing as non-conscious information processing), the cognitive con-
tinuum theory deals with the outcome (intuition as a consciously regis-
tered outcome), i.e. the resulting cognitive style. Neuroscience seems 
to assert that the deployment of the two processes, deliberative and in-
tuitive, depends to a large extent on the level of prior experience which 
echoes the NDM tradition. 
Intuitive expertise and NDM
A signiicant amount of research has been conducted in the NDM frame-
work, which explains the connections between intuition and expertise 
(Klein, Chapter 6; Lipshitz et al., 2001). This movement claims that in 
speciic settings (uncertainty, time pressure, high stakes, permanently 
changing conditions, etc.), experts do not generate and compare sets 
of options but rather use their prior experience to categorize situations 
rapidly. Expertise is organized in highly sophisticated patterns which 
are context-dependent or domain-speciic. Many NDM models exist; 
the Recognition Primed Decision model (RPD) of Klein is one of them 
and is “a blend of intuition and analysis” (Klein, Chapter 6: 74). The “pat-
tern matching” is a speed tacit knowledge process which compares the 
observed situation with typical situations already encountered in prior 
experience. Then, using mental simulation, the decision-maker imag-
ines an option until it appears to it the situation. According to Klein, 
the pattern-matching element is the intuitive part (System 1, fast and 
unconscious) and the mental simulation is the conscious and analytical 
part (System 2, slow and deliberate). “A purely intuitive strategy rely-
ing only on pattern matching would be too risky because sometimes 
the pattern matching generates lawed options” (Klein, Chapter 6: 74). 
When testing the prediction from the RPD model, the irst option the 
expert considers is usually satisfactory, which “exempliies Herbert Si-
mon’s notion of satisicing” (Klein, Chapter 6: 74). Training in intuitive 
decision-making allows a person “to size up situations more quickly, 
recognize problems and anomalies of the situation and feel conident 
when selecting the irst course of action” (Bakken & Haeren, Chapter 
11: 127). The NDM movement has contributed to the work of numer-
ous types of professional: army small-unit leaders, Navy commanders, 
jurors, anesthesiologists, airline pilots, nurses, highway engineers, etc. 
(see also the special issue of Organization Studies, 27(7), 2006). 
Linking intuition with NDM would seem to limit the application of intu-
ition to experts alone. According to Sinclair, this is only one – and quite 
a narrow – view of intuition as relying exclusively on experiences which 
we already possess. The distinction between inferential and holistic in-
tuition is useful to understand why intuition must be considered in a 
broader sense. 
Inferential and holistic intuition
In the framework of NDM, experts’ knowledge is organized in highly 
sophisticated patterns coming from their previous accumulated expe-
riences. In this speciic case, intuition is termed “inferential” by Pretz 
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(Chapter 2) because experts’ knowledge is organized in a meaningful 
way, allowing them to rely on the long-term memory of these typical 
and automatized conigurations. They automatically recognize familiar 
situations and intuitively know how to react with remarkably high speed 
and accuracy by trusting intuition (Pretz, Chapter 2: 19 & 23). Thanks 
to relevant methodological work tools such as cognitive task analysis 
(CTA, Crandall, Klein & Hofman, 2006), the experts are partly able to 
expose some of the inferences used. This kind of process is also called 
“matching style” by Sinclair (Chapter 1: 10). Nevertheless, intuition can 
also be of a holistic type. It is non-sequential and usually deals with the 
high-speed synthesis of “unconnected memory fragments” (Sinclair, 
Chapter 1: 5) in a new framework which is incompatible with conscious 
deliberation. The outcome is something new and is close to what 
Glöckner and Ebert (Chapter 14) call “constructive style”. It seems that 
holistic intuition is appropriate in highly complex problems and may be 
used also by non-experts in their daily lives. 
Inferential intuitive judgments… rely on… automated analyses
Holistic intuitive judgments… rely on… holistic integration of 
cues 
The link between complexity and intuition has a corollary: the link be-
tween intuition and expertise in a given ield. For Pretz (Chapter 2: 
22-24), the novices mainly use a holistic intuition because they do not 
have enough knowledge to use an analytic approach. As soon as ex-
perience grows, the “intermediate experts” start to become familiar with 
and handle the rules, so that they can give analytic responses. When 
a high level of expertise is reached, inferential intuition - supported by 
sophisticated domain knowledge – becomes possible. Yet, this does 
not exclude holistic intuition, when the issue is felt to be highly complex 
(e.g. an important number of variables and/or a completely new phe-
nomenon). For Sinclair, the NDM literature is interesting but does not 
exhaust knowledge of the intuitive processes because mainly focused 
on inferential intuition. 
Creative intuition
Beyond the ield of decision, intuition also includes creative properties 
as exposed by Strick & Dijksterhuis (Chapter 3). For the “Unconscious 
Thought Theory”, intuition can produce something fundamentally new, 
which then paves the way to creativity (the “Aha ! moment” in Chapter 
3 ; “insight” in Chapter 5, or “Euréka !” in Koestler, 1965). This theory 
studies the combination of or alternation between active searches for 
information on an issue, where the individual searcher is goal-oriented, 
and incubation periods, where he stops any active attention (period of 
“distraction”) to listen inally to what he feels (“gut feeling”; Gigerenzer, 
2007). “Distraction” is a phase of diverted attention; it acts as a ‘bubble’ 
that puts to sleep poor heuristics or the setting on rigid patterns to pro-
mote a fresh look on the issue. This incubation interlude should not be 
merged into passivity because the subject knows he has to ind the 
solution (he is goal-oriented). Unconscious thought is goal-dependent, 
i.e. without a goal, people do not engage in unconscious thought. The 
same idea, called “defocused attention”, is developed by Duggan and 
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Mason (Chapter 7: 83) about strategic intuition: “insights do not come 
to those who simply ignore problems or wait passively for solutions to 
bubble to consciousness”. 
Therefore, with Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith (Chapter 5), we need to 
identify the roles played by incubation and intuition in the processes 
leading to insight. Along Hogarth’s lines (2001: 254), we can say that 
“insight” is “typically reserved for those moments when people sud-
denly realize that they can “see into” the structure of problems” (Hodg-
kinson & Sadler-Smith (Chapter 5: 53) so that the solution suddenly 
enters conscious awareness. This subjective experience is followed 
by a “strong conviction of certainty”. Laboratory studies (e.g. the Re-
mote Associates Test) support the role of incubation and intuition in the 
process leading to insight. Sinclair (Chapter 1) considers that we must 
expand intuition to creation and not limit it to a domain-speciic exper-
tise: our everyday experiences are also a source of intuition. Strategic 
management and entrepreneurs (Chapters 7 and 8) combine existing 
dispersed patterns in novel and creative ways. We must go beyond ex-
pertise to link intuition with broad experience accumulated in the past 
directly or indirectly via reading, seeing and hearing. Finally, even if cre-
ative intuition seems instantaneous at the “Eureka!” moment, it is not 
always immediate: a long period of incubation may be necessary. For 
some researchers, the positive properties of incubation may be related 
to the role of a state characterized by “psychophysiological coherence” 
(McCraty, Atkinson, Tomasino & Bradley, 2009; Tomasino, Chapter 21); 
this state would be “a state of optimal function” which is associated 
with emotional stability, reduced stress and negative emotions and an 
increase in positive emotions (Tomasino, Chapter 21: 254). 
Intuition in critical occupations: life, death and law
The third part of the book (Intuition in professional/occupational do-
mains, Chapters 10 to 15) will perhaps ‘speak louder’ to management 
scholars. Since intuition is discussed through concrete occupations, 
the authors seem to consider that its virtues are greater than experi-
mental laboratory models tend to show. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the contributors deal with critical situations (emergency nursing 
and emergency medicine, ireighting, aviation, crisis management) but 
also with apparently counter-intuitive occupations as legal expertise. 
Langan-Fox and Vranic (Chapter 10: 111-119) underline the role of in-
tuition in what they call “critical settings”: “may be because of the gravity 
of their decisions, professionals in these occupations do not take intu-
ition lightly […] intuition is a vital construct” (authors' emphasis). Nurs-
ing intuition, for example, appears to be an important component of 
medical diagnosis. The authors show that knowledge, experience and 
expertise are reciprocally dependent and interact permanently so that 
intuition is a valid behavior not only in emergency but also in clinical 
nursing. Intuition is mixed with analysis and is also eicient in detecting 
instantaneous danger elsewhere, such as in air-traic control, military 
combat or law enforcement. Here, intuition is heavily linked with train-
ing, observing cues and signals that indicate danger, responding to 
emergencies and noticing with all our senses and not only over-relying 
140
M@n@gement vol. 15 no. 1, 2012, 133-144
book review
on our vision: “our senses are stronger than we think” (Langan-Fox and 
Vranic, Chapter 10: 117). In other words, intuition is linked with mindful-
ness (Dane, Chapter 18). 
Paradoxically, if classic military decision-making models omit or dimin-
ish the role of intuitive decision-making in the outcome of military oper-
ations, military command demands continuous adaptation to dynamic 
and vital situations along the lines of the advice ofered in the Crisis 
Management Manual of the Norwegian Police (Bakken & Haerem, 
Chapter 11: 123). In contrast with a sequential view of decision-mak-
ing, the authors show that, even in this kind of context, conceptualizing 
intuition and analysis within a dual process perspective, working in a 
complementary manner, is starting to become more common. Accord-
ing to the authors, crisis management, which is the term usually ad-
opted in military or rescue settings, requires both processes, as more 
recent military models show (Bakken & Haerem, Chapter 11: 124). Due 
to the speciic context of crisis, which involves time pressure and task 
complexity, conscious deliberation is not always possible. Intuitive pro-
cessing could and should be learned in parallel with analytical thinking 
because of time pressure in particular. 
We believe that one of the most interesting chapters is that written by 
Glöckner and Ebert (Chapter 14) on legal intuition and expertise. The 
extensive consequences of legal decisions are one reason for this, 
while the other is the ‘ine-grained’ analysis put forward by the authors. 
Based on dual processing models (System 1/System 2), they explain 
that “hunches” or “feelings” are a necessary condition for making valid 
legal judgments which are usually highly complex in di cult cases. Of 
course, this does not mean that judges should avoid deliberating: legal 
judgment “must be supplemented by deliberate processes that enables 
for correcting of biases” (Glöckner and Ebert, Chapter 14: 157-58). An 
example is given about the simplest class of intuitive processes, as-
sociative intuition, which should be avoided in legal judgment. This 
process refers to direct afective responses to stimuli that result from 
previous experiences with suicient similar stimuli, e.g. a defendant 
who is similar to another individual of whom the judge has experience 
(Glöckner and Ebert, Chapter 14: 161). 
Another (positive) class of intuitive processes is matching intuition, 
which is essential for layers because “it quickly provides them with a 
feeling of how similar cases have (on average) been decided before. 
This is particularly important in common-law countries like the US, 
where legal arguments are heavily based on precedent cases” (Glöck-
ner and Ebert, Chapter 14: 162). This second type of intuition refers to 
the NDM framework. A third class of intuitive processes (constructive 
intuition) builds consistent interpretations on the basis of evidence and 
prior knowledge. This type of intuition often leads to quick holistic im-
pressions. In legal decision-making, the “story model” “posits that jurors 
impose a narrative story organization on trial information… Meaning is 
assigned to trial evidence through the incorporation of that evidence 
into one or more plausible accounts (stories) describing ‘what hap-
pened’ during events. The best story is selected, based on coherence, 
coverage, goodness-of-it and uniqueness. This process of story con-
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struction may involve deliberation but may also emerge spontaneously” 
(Glöckner and Ebert, Chapter 14: 162-163). Of course, intuition may 
have pitfalls and biases, and deliberation with a view to re-checking 
and imagining the opposite interpretation usually helps to reduce er-
rors. 
The role of afects
The whole book shows that intuition includes afective components. 
Emotions and afects interfere with or support intuitive processes, but 
what is not clear is whether they precede (afects as antecedents) or 
compose (afects as a process component) the process and/or conirm 
the outcomes coming to consciousness. For Dane and Pratt (2007), 
intuition is an afectively charged judgment: those authors consider af-
fects to be a component of the process but the question of the stage of 
feeling is not clear. Coget (Chapter 12) discusses the role of emotions 
in intuitive decision-making, and not mood , which is a more fuzzy and 
permanent state. The author does not discuss the ‘dark side’ of emo-
tions. He proposes a “critical decisions vortex model” of “how rational 
decision making, intuitive decision making and emotions supplement, 
complement or impede each other” (Coget, Chapter 12: 134). This 
model is a meta-process of thinking, intuiting and feeling. He shows 
that, while overwhelming emotions can interrupt decision-making, 
emotions of a lower intensity possibly energize action and facilitate 
empathy. For example, intuition can alert physicians to revisit an earlier 
diagnosis based on rational conclusions. This model is also tested in 
two other contexts whose characteristics are very diferent from emer-
gency rooms: movie sets and wineries. 
While mainstream research has developed models of intuiting related 
to cognitive processes within the brain, a few studies sustain that the 
heart, a “hold-held notion” is involved in the psychophysiological and 
emotional processes that underlie - and precede - intuiting experience 
(Tomasino, Chapter 21). Intuition is then considered as a whole-body 
process “by which intuitive perception occurs and also […] appears 
to enhance intuitive receptivity” (Tomasino, Chapter 21: 247, author’s 
emphasis). Congruent with research of Immordino-Yang and Damasio 
(2007), in positive emotional states, when the heart generates a har-
monious, coherent rhythm of activity, the resulting pattern of cardiac 
aferent input to the brain contributes to cortical facilitation, whereby 
higher cognitive faculties are enhanced (McCraty et al., 2009) and may 
be trained with speciic tools. 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The book provides and discusses diferent methods in experimental 
and natural settings, from seminal research dealing with systematic bi-
ases associated with certain types of intuitive judgments (laboratory 
experiments in the HB tradition) to recent work using interdisciplinary 
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techniques (e.g. in the NDM framework). Methods used by scholars 
to elucidate how intuition processes are numerous and controversial. 
From knowledge elicitation methods to neuroimaging, many tech-
niques are used to “track” intuitive processing and outcomes (Hodg-
kinson & Sadler-Smith, Chapter 5: 60; Tomasino, Chapter 21). Due to 
people’s bias to favor positive rather than negative outcomes, scholars 
must study the whole range of intuitive processes, i.e. “the hits and the 
misses”, which is not an easy task. First, ‘think-aloud techniques’ may 
not be suicient; secondly, intuitive processing cannot necessarily be 
elucidated because of its tacit nature. 
A number of NDM researchers use CTA (Crandall et al., 2006) in or-
der to identify the cues and strategies used by experts in their intuitive 
judgments but without being able to explain why experts made their 
decisions. One of the reasons is that experts possess practical intel-
ligence which is not easy to account for. Most of the techniques aim at 
retrospectively recovering intuitive episodes such as Critical Incident 
Technique (Flanagan, 1954), while others try to capture intuiting at the 
moments of its occurrence (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, Chapter 5: 
59). The former are subject to sources of bias and inaccuracy, while 
the latter are relatively time-consuming or may need researchers to be 
present. The latter is not necessarily possible nor in tune with “on-the-
spot” intuitive episodes, e.g. in some dangerous or speciic contexts 
(medicine, air-traic control, rescue, etc.). Ethnographic research and 
phenomenological inquiry could be another means to gain a irst-hand 
description of one speciic domain of experience. Guided introspection 
based on psycho-phenomenological methods would also ofer the po-
tential for higher levels of ‘granularity’ in natural settings (Petitmengin, 
2006, 2009). 
By contrast with eliciting techniques, other recent physio-neuro tech-
niques are used in laboratories in order to identify intuition episodes 
and physical manifestations of intuitive processes. Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, Electroencephalography and Skin Conductance 
Responses are three kinds of neuroimaging techniques aiming at track-
ing “somatic markers” that inform decisions and therefore “operate in 
advance of conscious awareness” (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, Chap-
ter 5: 62). In Chapter 21, Tomasino conirms that “electrophysiological 
studies have typically shown that the body responds to a future, ran-
domly selected stimulus 4-7 seconds before (author’s emphasis: 249) 
the stimulus is experienced”. The book invites researchers to develop 
more interdisciplinary research using multiple and mixed methods in 
order to cross-fertilize their views of this “complex and intriguing phe-
nomena” (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, Chapter 5). 
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CULTIVATING INTUIT-ING?
The last part of the book deals with “cultivating intuition” and begins 
with an interesting chapter written by Dane (Chapter 18). One of the 
main ideas is that intuition is linked to “a mindful state of consciousness 
in which […] attention is directed toward present moment phenomena” 
(author’s emphasis). Dane explains that “one who is in a mindful state 
of consciousness attends to […] both external (environmental) and in-
ternal (intra-psychic) phenomena, as each is integral to the moment 
in which one is engaged […]. Mindfulness has been described as the 
clear and single-minded awareness of what actually happens to us and 
in us at the successive moments of perception” (author’s emphasis: 
222). This last argument, according to which individuals tend to notice 
more internal phenomena than they otherwise would, is very important: 
mindfulness is associated with high levels of self-concordance with 
respect to implicit (non-consciously based) and explicit (consciously 
evaluated) afective states. We can easily link these arguments with 
those of Weick and Sutclife’s work (2006), as the author says himself: 
mindfulness would be a condition, an aware resource of deeply root-
ing for intuit-ing. Thus, according to Kuhnle (Chapter 19), Burke and 
Sadler-Smith (Chapter 20) and Tomasino (Chapter 21), intuition could 
and should be honed through training and integrated into higher edu-
cation and other occupations such as those discussed earlier in the 
book (e.g. management, medicine, aviation, rescue, etc.). 
In spite of deep divergences between some authors, it clearly emerges 
from this book that intuition gathers many contributors from diferent 
scientiic disciplines which engage in eicient dialogue, and in particu-
lar psychology and neuroscience, which is unsurprising in the modern 
world. Both these disciplines, along with ergonomics and education, 
are currently supplying fruitful research on intuition, while management 
is, rather, waiting for more results and teaching methods. This variety 
reveals connections that one would have deemed improbable years 
ago, e.g. the article recently written by Kahneman and Klein (2009), 
who operate according to opposite traditions (HB vs NDM). This article 
shows a starting convergence that the book underlines with optimism 
on page 59: “a psychology of intuitive judgment and decision-making 
that ignores intuitive skills is seriously blinkered” while “a psychology of 
professional judgment that neglects predictable errors cannot be ad-
equate” (In Kahneman & Klein, 2009: 525).
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